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UNDER FRIEDRICH RAINERI 
Maurice Williams 
In September 1943 Adolf Hitler appointed Friedrich Rainer 
High Commissioner of the Operation Zone Adriatic Coastland 
(OZAK). For the next year and a half Rainer, who was also Gauleiter of 
nearby Carinthia and Chief of the occupied territories of Upper 
Carniola (presently the northwestern part of Slovenia), ruled this 
region as the Fuhrer's deputy. He was a remarkable official and an 
uncommon personality who became an important survivor of and 
witness to the Third Reich's collapse. Tried in Ljubljana and supposedly 
executed by the Yugoslavs in the summer of 1947, Rainer in fact lived 
and worked for his captors until 1950 and possibly later. He wrote 
hundreds of pages of history, political analysis, and personality 
assessments. Among these pages is a striking document which deals 
with the Adriatic Coastland. It offers a wealth of information on the 
region's Nazi government. It depicts a remarkable contrast between 
Rainer's approach to the occupied territories and the neighboring 
OZAK. Further, it sheds considerable light on the personality and 
character of Rainer. It shows how he altered his rule from intense 
German nationalist in Slovenia to advocate of ethnic diversity in the 
Adriatic. 
Rainer's extensive treatise on the OZAK was written sometime 
after January 1948. He probably wrote it in German as he spoke no 
foreign languages, although the only copy to survive is in Croatian. Why 
it was translated into Croatian is a mystery, since this ninety-three-
page account is the only one of his numerous documents in that 
language. Usually his articles were translated into Slovene from the 
original German. In this particular treatise Rainer showed an amazing 
1 I wish to thank the Professional Development Committee and the 
Grants-in-Aid Committee at Okanagan University College for their 
generous assistance in supporting the research for this article. 
3 
4 MAURICE WILLIAMS 
, , 
recall of names, positions, and people; only occasionally does he not 
remember some of the particulars.2 
The general tone of the paper is anti-Italian and pro-ethnic 
diversity. Rainer stresses that his ultimate goal in the OZAK was peace, 
order, and efficiency. But in order to do this, aside from dealing with the 
growing partisan threat, he had to fend off the national animosities of 
the three groups living there the Slovenes, the Croatians, and the 
Italians. To temper their hatreds and lessen their rancor, Rainer argued 
that it was crucial to end Italian domination and stop the activities of the 
para-military groups sponsored by the Italian Fascists. Second, in 
conjunction with curbing Italian influence, he planned to introduce 
balanced government and evenhanded authority. This strategy meant 
he had to acknowledge and accept the Slovenes and Croatians. These 
two approaches then, reducing Italian domination and introducing a 




Such a multi-ethnic approach in the OZAK was a dramatic 
shift from the course he had previously followed in Upper Carniola. 
There, Rainer wrote, he pursued a threefold policy: (1) include the area 
in the general territory of the Reich, (2) Germanize the people, and (3) 
2 
3 
F. Rainer, "Osnivanje i djelatnost organa vrhovnog komesara u 
operativnoj zoni 'jadranska obala'" (Ljubljana: Ministrstvo za notranje 
zadeve [MNZJ, n.d, [after January 1948?]), INV 761,80-4,11-30. 
I am indebted to Eddie Truden from Hamilton, Ontario, now 
living in Ljubljana, for providing the working translation of this 
document. 
Rainer also wrote a variation and shorter version as: "Die 
'Operationszone Adriatisches Kiistenland' [OZAK] unter besonderer 
Beriicksichtigung der Verhaltnisse in Triest" (MNZ, n.d.), Inv 761, 80-
4, 111-8, 
Rainer, "Osnivanje" 1601. See also Erich Roethel, "Die weisse Stadt 
am Meer," and Roethel, "Susak und Fiume," Deutsche Zeitung in 
Kroatien 9 May 1944: 1 and 11 May 1944: 1. 
Another key objective-really more important than Rainer's 
twin goals-was the defeat of the partisans. While he proposed that he 
take control of this campaign the task was conducted ruthlessly by the 
military and police. See Claus Gatterer, 1m Kampf gegen Rom [Vienna: 
Europa, 1968] 807; F. W. Deakin, The Brutal Friendship [London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962]613. 
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relocate the local population where necessary, replacing them with 
immigrant Germans.4 His methods in Upper Carniola were decidedly 
nationalistic. But for the OZAK he advocated something quite different. 
To understand this change and to appreciate the new policy Rainer 
promoted, some background on the region's geography, Rainer himself, 
and his Germanism is important. 
GEOGRAPHY 
The area from the northeast corner of the Adriatic, including 
Istria, through present Slovenia and Italian Friuli-Venezia Giulia and 
into the Austrian provinces of Carinthia and Styria is a region of mixed 
and complex ethnicity Germans, Slovenes, Italians, Friulians, and 
Croatians. Until the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy it was 
composed or was part of the duchies of CarnioJa, Carinthia, and Styria, 
the county of Gorica, the Margravite of istria, and the city of Trieste. 
On the western and eastern peripheries there were also Italian and 
Hungarian jurisdictions (figure 1).5 An idea of the diversity of this 
region comes from population statistics compiled shortly after the 
beginning of this century. In Carniola 94% of the population was 
Slovene and 5% German, although along the border with Carinthia-
where a plebescite was held after the First World War to determine 
whether the area would go to Austria or Yugoslavia the mix was 67% 
Slovene and 33% German. In all of Carinthia the mix was closer to 75% 
German and 25% Slovene. The Adriatic Littoral was the most diverse 
area Slovene, 32%; Croatian, 20%; Italian, 43%; and German, 3.5%.6 
With the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy the region was divided 
between Italy, rump Austria, and newly created Yugoslavia. The ethnic 
diversity, however, did not disappear. 
Slovenia, which plays a large role in this study, was created in 
1919 largely from territories acquired from old Austria. It included the 




Rainer, "Osnivanje" 1602. 
Carole Rogel, "In the Beginning: The Slovenes from the 7th Century to 
1945," ed. Jill Benderly and Evan Kraft. Independent Slovenia: Origins, 
Movements and Prospects (New York: St. Martin's, 1994) 4. 
Helga Harriman, Slovenia under Nazi Occupation, 1941-1945 (New 
York: Studia Slovenica, 1977) II; C. A. Macaliney, The Habsburg 
Empire 1790-1918 (New York: Macmillan, 1969) 676. 
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Carinthia, and a small strip from Hungary. After the First World War it 
formed, along with Croatia and Serbia, the Kingdom of the South Slavs, 
which later became Yugoslavia. In April 1941, with the collapse of 
Yugoslavia, the Italians and the Germans split Slovenia. The southern 
portion, including Ljubljana, went to the Italians, who called it the 
Province of Ljubljana, while the northern section was occupied by the 
Germans. I n the north the Germans further divided the area into two 
civil administrative units: the northeast portion, Lower Styria, 
administered by the Nazi authorities in Gau Styria, and a western part 
directed by officials in Gau Carinthia. The western portion was referred 
to as the Occupied Territories of Carinthia and Carniola, although 
Hitler also ordered that it be called South Carinthia. Officially the two 
regions were not attached to the Third Reich as the Nazis wanted to 
pacify the area first. De facto, in April 1941, they were annexed (figure 
2).7 \ 
In 1943, when Mussolini's Italy collapsed and the Germans 
occupied that country and its appendages, Hitler created two 
"operational zones" on the northern Adriatic. One was the Alpenvorland 
under the Gauleiter of Tyrol, consisting of Bolzano (Bozen), Trento and 
Bell uno. The second, the Adriatic Coastland, included the seven 
Italian, Slovene, and Croatian districts of Friuli, Gorz, Trieste, Istria, 
Fiume, Laibach (Ljubljana), and Quarnero (the Croatian Littoral). It 
was directed by the Gauleiter of Carinthia.8 The political direction had 
again changed, but not the ethnic diversity. 
7 
8 
Office of Strategic Services (OSS), "The German De Facto Annexation 
of the NOIiheastern Italian Provinces," 1 September 1944, United 
States National Archives (USNA), RG 226, R & A 2208, Microfiche 
Pub 1221; Helga Harriman, "Slovenia as an Outpost of the Third 
Reich," East European Quarterly 5.2 (1972): 223; Tone Ferenc, "The 
Austrians and Slovenia during the Second World War," ed. Fred 
Parkinson, Conquering the Past: Austrian Nazism Yesterday and Today 
(Detroit: Wayne State UP, 1989) 210-15. 
Der Reichsminister und Chef der Reichskanzlei (Lammers) an die 
Obersten Reichsbeh6rden, Berlin, 11.09.1943, Karl Stuhlpfarrer, Die 
Operationszonen 'Alpenvorland' und 'Adriatisches Kiistenland' 1943-
1945 (Vienna: Bruder Hollinek, 1969) 137-39. 
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RAINER AND GE ISM 
Born in Carinthia on the fringes of Germanic culture, 
Friedrich Rainer grew up in an intensely German environment. His 
family traced its national heritage back several centuries. His father, a 
middle school teacher, was an enthusiastic German nationalist, an 
official of the German-Democratic Party, and later a strong supporter of 
the Greater German People's Party. As a school boy Rainer's favorite 
teacher was Martin Wutte, a historian who taught him about the so-
called Germanic mission of Carinthia. Wutte was one of the most 
outspoken, scholarly, and active proponents ofthis mission. In 1919 and 
1920 Rainer participated in the "Stop the Slav" movement in the 
Klagenfurt Basin. He joined his father and brother as a member of the 
local paramilitary unit. Later, as a student, he took part in the traditional 
embodiment of German nationalism, a dueling fraternity. He continued 
his fraternal association as a member of an alumni group in Klagenfurt, 
a chapter typically called the "Wartburg." An athlete, he helped 
organize the Carinthian Wehrtumbewegung, a gymnastic organization in 
the tradition of the nineteenth-century founder of Gennan nationalism 
and father of gymnastics, Tumvater J ahn. 10 After 1923, as a National 
Socialist he supported the Fuhrer in the belief that the Third Reich was, 
as he wrote, "a German nation state, in which there is no foreign 
minority. "11 In short, he typified the fervent Gennan nationalist who 
found a home in Hitler's movement. 
Following the 1938 Anschluss Rainer became one of the 
Fuhrer's key subordinates in old Austria and an active proponent of the 
"German only" policy. First he served as Gauleiter of Salzburg. In late 
1941, however, he returned to Carinthia as Gauleiter and governor 
10 
11 
Dr. jur. Friedrich Rainer, 8 Jan. 1942, Archiv fUr pubHzistische Arbeit, 
Arbeiterkammer fUr Wien (AKW); "Die Ahnenheimat unseres 
Gauleiters Dr. Rainer," Wochenblatt der Landesbauernschaft Kiirnten 
(Klagenfurt), 22 July 1944: 1, 61 ReI Reichslandbund, Pressearchiv 
#356, Rainer, Bundesarchiv, Abteilung Potsdam; Vernehmungs-
niederschrift (Rainer's interrogation before his 1947 trial), MNZ, Inv 
761, 80-4, II-8, 549, 683-86; F. Rainer, "Uber die Kiirntner 
Slovenen-Frage," (MNZ, n.d. [after JanuarY 1948?]), Inv 761, 80-4, 
II-18, 1376, 1378, 1389; F. Rainer, "Die Wehrturnbewegung in 
Kiirnten," (MNZ, n.d.), Inv 761,80-4, 1204, 1209. 
Rainer, "Uber die Kiirntner Slovenen-Frage" 1405. 
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(Reichsstatthalter). Concurrently he became Chief of the civil admini-
stration in South Carinthia, the occupied territories. The inauguration 
ceremonies marking his arrival in Klagenfurt epitomize his advocacy of 
Germandom. The tone was set by Robert Ley, the Reich Organization 
Leader, who installed him as Gauleiter. Ley spoke of the region's 
thousand-year role as protector of Gennanic culture. "The heart of the 
nation" he said, "lies not in the middle, but on the border .... There is the 
greatest love." Carinthia, the border Gau, was the purest building stone 
of the Reich.12 
Rainer took up this theme when it was his tum to speak. He 
promised to lead in the best old Carinthian tradition, a heritage which 
was deeply German in character. Carinthians had lived and died to 
preserve that legacy. As for the newly returned lands of South 
Carinthia, he announced that the Fuhrer had ordered him to take them 
firmly in hand and make them once again purely German. 13 
This same theme was repeated two weeks later when Rainer 
was installed as the first Reichsstatthalter of Carinthia by Interior 
Minister Wilhelm Frick. ''Your principal task, Party Member Rainer," 
Frick implored, "will be to include in the German Reich the entire new 
areas of Southeast Carinthia and Upper Carniola... Make this district 
entirely German again. "14 Young people must be taught only in German 
and the German language must be given first priority in public life. 
"When not only the outward appearances, such as official signs ... are 
German, but when also all the young people ... speak German, and 
when in the family circle the Slovene language is replaced by 
German only then will we be able to speak of the Germanization of the 
Upper Kranj [Upper Carniolaj."ls 
Rainer may not have been the originator of this policy to 
germanize the Slovenes who lived there, but he clearly endorsed and 





"Dr. Ley in Klagenfurt: 'Der Fuhrer hatte Kamten keinen besseren 
Gauleiter geben konnen a1s Dr. Rainer,''' Kiirntner Grenzruf 1 
December 1941. 
"Dr. Ley," Kiirntner Grenzruf 
Wilhelm Frick, testimony, Trial a/the Major War Criminals before the 
International Military Tribunal 20 (Nuremburg, 1947-49) 363. 
Frick 107. 
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to this end. There was already an active deportation program in place 
and a busy office of the Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of 
the German Race in Bled. New bureaucrats, native Gennans or 
Slovenes loyal to the occupying authorities, had earlier replaced local 
officials from the old Yugoslav regime. The Slovene language had been 
displaced as the language of school instruction. Rainer continued these 
efforts and extended them. Deportation of Slovenes began in April 1942 
and was supplemented by efforts to re-populate the land with 
Volksdeutsche from Italy and Eastern Europe. Only the expanding war 
coupled with vigorous partisan campaigns stopped the full imple-
mentation of the resettlement plans. Meanwhile, assimilation pressures 
intensified. Signs were set up ordering everyone to "speak German." 
Family and first names were to take German spellings and pronun-
ciations. Societies, youth organizations, literary groups, and other 
cultural associations had to abandon the Slovene language and adopt 
German. There were, of course, arrests and imprisonments for those 
who did not comply.16 
April 
16 
. Rainer made no secret of his germanizing intentions. On 30 
1942, the first anniversary of the Reich take over of South 
OSS, "German Military Government over Europe: Yugoslavia," 1 
December 1944, USNA, RG 226, R & A 2500.5, Microfiche 1221; 
Ferenc, "The Austrians and Slovenia" 211-14, 216; Valentin Sima, 
"Die Karntner Slowenen unter Nationalsozialistischer Herrschaft," ed. 
E. Talos et al., NS-Herrschaft in Osterreich, 1938-1945 (Vienna: Verlag 
fUr Gesellschaftskritik, 1988) 371; Thomas Barker, The Slovene 
Minority in Carinthia (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1984) 194-
96; Tone Ferenc, "Nacisti~ni raznarodovalni program in Slovenci (Das 
nationalsozialistische Entnationalisierungsprogram und die Slowen-
en)," ed. A. Malle and V. Sima, Der "Anschluss" und die Minderheiten in 
Osterreich / "Anslus" in manjsine v Austriji (Klagenfurt: Drdava, 1989) 
65; Stefan Karner, Kiimtens Wirtschaft 1938-1945 (Klagenfurt: 
Magistrat des Landeshauptstadt Klagenfurt, 1976) 124; F. Rainer, 
Verordnung tiber die deutsche Schreibweise von Vor- und Familien-
namen in den besetzten Gebieten Karntens und Krains, Klagenfurt, 10 
February 1942, Verordnungs- und Amtsblatt des Chefs der Zivilverwaltung 
in den besetzten Gebieten Kiimtens und Krains, Arhiv Republike 
Slovenije, Ljubljana; Dietmar Laracher, "The Slovenes in Austria," 
RazPrave in gradivo- Treatises and Documents (Ljubljana: In~titut za 
narodnostna vpra~anja, 1986) 383. 
12 MAURICE WILLIAMS 
. , 
Carinthia, he wrote in the daily paper: "The land up to the Karawanken 
and south of the Karawanken is Gelman and will be German again. "17 
In September 1942 he reminded the people of Krainburg of their 
thousand years of common history with the Germans and expressed his 
pleasure that this land had come home to the Greater Gelman Reich. I8 
A month later, he proclaimed that the party goal for 1943 was to 
assimilate the lands to the south, making them one with the rest of 
Carinthia. 19 The Gelman nationalist apparently moved with 
determination toward his goal. 
THE ETHNICALLY DIVERSE NAZI 
These statements, however, hid an anomoly. Sometime in the 
spring of 1943 Rainer began to change his mind and grew increasingly 
skeptical of reaching his goals. It became abundantly clear to him that 
germanization was unattainable because the methods of implemen-
tation were unworkable. He recognized that the best efforts in the war 
against the partisans were proving fruitless. There was no growing 
germanization, only an expanding, ever more active partisan 
movement. He saw that German military and administrative resources 
were stretched to the limit. He noticed that a general dislike of Germans 
by the Slovenes was obvious and growing.'!) Rainer later wrote of this in 
his postwar treatise on the Adriatic Coastland. Tough germanization 
measures, he said, in the end brought only destablization and disorder. 
Activities like collective repressions against the population, were 
viewed as unbelievable acts of injustice. They drove even otherwise law 
abiding citizens to join the resistance." I have to admit publicly that our 
methods in Upper Carniola were against basic rights," and even more 




Gauleiter Rainer, "Die Aufgabe des Reichsgaues Kamten," Kamtner 
GrenzruJ30 April 1942: 1. 
Rede und Proklamation des Gauleiters und Reichsstatthalters Dr. 
Rainer gehalten bei der Grosskundgebung am 27.September 1942 in 
Krainburg, Carton 33, #6/1, Yugoslav Military Institute, Belgrade. 
"Entgiiltige Lasung der kamtner Frage," Neues Wiener Tagh/att 6 
(November 1942). Presse Archiv, Arbeitskammer flir Wien [AKW]. 
Rainer, "Osnivanje" 1602-1604; Alfred Elste, "Das Bild der Kamtner 
Slowenen in den nationalsozialistischen Presse und Wissenschaft," diss., 
UniversitatWien, 1981,216-17. See also Harriman, "Slovenia" 228-
29. 
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been needed was to offer a more "friendly hand" toward the Slovene 
people. With this in mind Rainer began to develop a new position-
"minorities have basic national rights," a quite different approach.21 
Since he could not at first make his new position known Hitler would 
have been opposed he concentrated on the basic goal of pacifying the 
southern border for the Reich. 22 
As support for his more friendly attitude toward the Slovenes, 
Rainer argued that early in his tenure he met Hitler and Himmler and 
convinced them that the term South Carinthia was historically and 
geographically inaccurate. He suggested instead a better expression, 
Upper Carniola (Oberkrain) because it had some foundation in past 
nomenclature. Rainer employed the term publicly for the first time in 
the fall of 1942. He claimed that he even altered this name, moving from 
references to Upper Carniolians instead to "Slovene-Germans" and 
then to "Slovenes." He also argued that he reintroduced the use of the 
Slovene language, at first as an aid in understanding German but 
eventually as a second language.21 Further, he maintained that even 
before the capitulation of Italy in 1943, he resolved that Laibach 
(Ljubljana), Istria, and Fiume should be united with Upper Carniola. "I 
came to the conclusion that it would be wise to unite the lands of the 
former duchy of Carniola, and to grant them cultural and administrative 
freedom." His plan, of course, did have a rider: it would occur "only in 
union with the Reich... German police and military forces would 
remain in the country. "24 
In pursuit of his plan Rainer met with Himmler after 
Mussolini's fall in July 1943. He sketched out his proposal for recreating 





Rainer, "Osnivanje" 1603-1604. See also Rainer, "Uber die kiimtner 
Slovenen-Frage" 1417 fT. 
Rainer, "Osnivanje" 1602. 
Niederschrift Dr; Friedrich Rainer, Niimberg, 30 November 1945, 
reproduced in Wilhelm Neumann, Martin Wutte (1876-1948) zum 
Gediichtnis (Klagenfurt: Verlag des Geschichtsvereines fUr Kiimten, 
1988) 42-43. 
Rainer, Vemehmungsniederschrift 571. See also Bogdan Novak, Trieste 
1941-54 (Chicago: U Chicago P, 1970) 75; Galliano Fogar, personal 
interview, 1 December 1995, Trieste. 
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agreed," he wrote.25 The Reichsfiihrer discussed the plan with Hitler who 
also acquiesced so long as the population remained peaceful. However, 
in the end the Fuhrer decided against any territorial changes because 
he did not formally want to dismantle Fascist Italy and provide Japan 
with a reason to re-negotiate the Tripartite Pact of 1940. A re-created 
duchy was not established. 2Ii But Rainer did persuade the Fuhrer and 
Himmler to accept the notion of cultural and political autonomy for the 
region. It was time to be practical and to admit that a German-only 
policy would not carry the day, that advocating ethnic diversity, at least 
for the time being, was more effective.27 
Although Rainer did not obtain his first choice a duchy for 
Camiola, a separate region for Gorz, and an Istria with headquarters in 
Trieste he did bring these lands under his control as the Operation 
Zone Adriatic Coastland.:Il! In September 1943 he became High 
Commissioner of this diverse ethnic region. How would he approach the 
territory? Based on his experiences in Upper Camiola, Rainer realized 
that it would be impossible to pursue germanizing objectives in the 
largely Slovene, Italian, and Croatian region.29 
What Rainer also realized was that recent history in the area 





Rainer, Vernehmungsniederschrift 572. 
Rainer, Vernehmungsniederschrift 588; Rainer, OZAK 4484. 
A strong case also argues that there were no formal changes because 
of "Mussolini's residual influence over Hitler." (Dennison Rusinow, 
Italy's Austrian Heritage, 1919-1946 [Oxford: Clarendon, 1969] 300). 
Rainer also received some unsolicited advice from his old teacher, 
Martin Wutte. On 19 September 1943 Wutte wrote Rainer, advising 
him to act carefully in the new portions of Slovenia. The policies in 
Upper Camiola in 1941 and 1942 had been dangerous and should not 
be repeated in the newly occupied regions. The advice to move 
cautiously, however, did not mean abandoning the long range desire to 
make the region German in its culture, economy, and outlook. (Wutte 
an Rainer, Klagenfurt, 19 September 1943, reproduced in Neuman 
30-32.) 
Rainer did not reply to Wutte until after the war. (Niedershcrift 
Rainer 42-43). 
Rainer to Ribbentrop, Klagenfurt, 9 September 1943, reproduced in 
Stuhlpfarrer 143-45. 
Rainer, "Osnivanje" 1602-1603. 
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least passive participants of the Third Reich. He knew that following 
the First World War, large numbers of Slovenes (and Croatians) lived 
within the eastern borders of an expanded Italy.30 The Fascist 
government of Mussolini, building upon the notion of an uninational 
state, adopted a policy of narrow nationalism and repressed these new 
minorities. The Fascists especially sought to assimilate the Slovenes by 
introducing compulsory use of Italian in schools, forcing italianization 
of names, prohibiting Slovene newspapers and books, and disbanding 
Slovene cultural and economic organizations. They forbade the use of 
the Slovene language at all public meetings and in the law courts, 
expelled Slovene-speaking bishops and clergy, and prevented Slovene-
speaking doctors from practicing medicine. They engaged in the arrest, 
imprisonment, deportation, and not infrequently, murder of any 
opposition to this harsh policy.31 A. J. P. Taylor wrote, "Italian rule over 
these South Slavs had no parallel in Europe. "32 In the end, however, the 
program of forced assimilation accomplished little beyond an impressive 
number of public works projects and a few colonies of Italians. It left 
instead a legacy of hatred toward Italians and their rule. 33 It was this 
loathing that allowed Rainer and the Germans to coerce many Slovenes 






The Slovenes came primarily from Primorska and Istria. Collectively 
this region was called the Julian March or Venezia Giulia. The Slovenes 
here numbered at least 250,000. Other accounts placed the figure 
(including Croatians) somewhere between 400,000 and 500,000. 
(Robert Rabel, Between East and West: Trieste, the United States, and the 
Cold War, 1941-1954 [Durham: Duke UP, 1988] 2; Rainer to 
Ribbentrop, 9 September 1943; Harriman, Slovenia 13.) 
"Political and Military Situation in Venezia Giulia," G-2 intelligence 
report, Combined Mediterranean Forces, Rome, n.d. (January 1945?), 
Public Record Office (PRO) WO 202/317; Margaret Carlyle, "Italy 
and the Yugoslav Minority in Venezia Giulia and Trieste," Research 
Department, Foreign Office, 9 September 1949, PRO FO 371/78658; 
Rabel 14-15; Rusinow 18; Anthony Klancar, "Slovenia and the 
Slovenes," Journal 01 Central European Affairs 6 (1946): 17; OSS, "De 
Facto Annexation." 
A. J. P. Taylor, "Trieste," n.p., n.d. (after May 1945?) 18. (Copy at the 
In~titut za novej~o zgodovino, Ljubljana.) 
Rusinow 3, 374. 
It was also the Nazi image of championing anti-Communism that 
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In his approach to the OZAK Rainer also turned to the Austro-
Hungarian empire for guidance. He saw there the notion of basic 
national minority rights. For the Austro-Hungarians this approach had 
meant that wherever officials or representatives of authority operated, it 
was advisable to use local people. This policy had theoretically allowed 
an equal distribution of power between different ethnic groups. The 
Austro-Hungarians, however, had made one major mistake , Rainer 
wrote. They had given the Italians too great an advantage. He would not 
make that mistake, opting instead for another way, one which was less 
Italian and more Slav. lI 
Rainer especially emphasized his Slav (Slovene) sympathies. 
He claimed that a book by Dr. Josef Marz, Die Adria/rage, greatly 
influenced him in the 19305. J6 Up to that time Rainer had taken an 
Italian perspective on the Adriatic. Marz, on the other hand, had taken 
a pro-Yugoslav position and presented a different historical, geogra-
phical , and ethnographical viewpoint. Rainer discovered from reading 
the book that the fascist policy in the region had not built up trust. Upon 
his appointment as High Commissioner Rainer re-read the book.37 He 
became convinced that by ending the Italian pressure of forced 
assimilation, the Slavic inhabitants of the coastland could, to a large 
extent, be pacified. Since the Italian Fascist party was responsible for 
the unsuccessful policy of assimilation, its members should be excluded 




attracted many others. See Rainer, OZAK 4498; Rainer, "Osnivanje" 
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interrogator after May 1945 acknowledged that the English had long 
believed he favored the Slav over the Italian. JJ 
What specifically did Rainer do as the new High Commissioner 
for the OZAK? According to his account he completely reversed the 
Italian policy toward minorities by restoring their national rights. 
Slovenes and Croatians were allowed to create autonomous regions, the 
Slovenes around Ljubljana and the Croatians in Susek and Krk. In the 
old Italian province of Ljubljana the government was separated from 
contact with Italy and from the other parts of the OZAK. Technically 
the area was still under Mussolini's new Fascist Republic, but 
practically this link disappeared as did all Italian officials. Rainer 
appointed the mayor of Ljubljana city, a Slovene and a fonner Habsburg 
officer, president of an autonomous zone and generally left the running 
of that area to him. Unlike Trieste, where Rainer regularly worked, he 
did not visit Ljubljana. For him Ljubljana province was a special case, 
and a first step toward restoring the old duchy ofCarniola.4) 
Throughout the remainder of his new territory Rainer held that 
he followed a tolerant policy. Slovene and Croatian schools were 
opened while native teachers, whom the Italians had removed, were 
brought back. In addition, "all my co-workers were strictly educated 
along the lines of national rights and equality. "41 The head of the Trieste 
Fascist Party was identified as too racist. "He preached the Roman-
German racial struggle against the Slavs; that was not only false, but for 
the present situation exactly wrong. "42 He and other Italian officials 
were replaced by new officials from the dominant nationality in the 
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Rainer was realistic enough, however, to acknowledge that in 
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not show tendencies of extreme nationalism. Further, the language of 
local government reflected the local majority.43 Finally, Rainer said, he 
encouraged the creation of cultural clubs and groups and not just 
associations for Slovenes and Croatians. He helped the Friulians as 
well. "I supported the Renaissance culture of Friuli just as I did in 
Carinthia. "44 
At the time Rainer had many discussions about this theme of 
"multicultural, friendly relations" and "basic minority rights" with 
German political and military figures. He felt he had generally 
convinced them of the usefulness of his program. Further he believed he 
was increasingly successful in his push for a lawful approach, that is, 
until the assassination attempt on Hitler in July 1944. After this date, 
German policy in Italy and elsewhere took its direction from Hitler's 
more extreme measures. 45 
Rainer was very much a Hitler loyalist, but on this topic, he 
disagreed with the Fuhrer. Hitler's approach that against force 
(resistance and the partisans) one can only use force was not correct. 
The practice had developed in the eastern campaigns that terror was to 
be met with even greater terror. In Italy and the two operation zones, 
Hitler ordered the radical cleansing of all partisans from the area. 
Terror again begat terror. As Rainer observed it was thus very difficult 
to gain the trust of the population. But did he do anything to counter the 
harsh directives? Rainer explained that he could not publicly or even 
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the Fuhrer and it was impossible to have any influence over them. Even 
though he personally disagreed at times, what Hitler and Himmler 
directed could not be stopped. Instead of directly challenging the orders 
then, Rainer argued that he attempted to soften them. He continued to 
pursue a more friendly approach to the population of his area.46 As 
evidence, he maintained that he prevented the continuation of national 
animosities and promoted ethnic diversity by providing good govern-
ment and by listening to the needs of the population. He appointed local 
nationals, placed a German advisor nearby as liaison, and sought out 
the best specialists from the Nazi Welfare Organization (N S 
Volkswohlfahrt), the German Labour Front, and other similar groups to 
help. Together these people gave him the good government that was 
lacking. He planned for self-administration for the region and the city 
of Trieste. He acknowledged the needs of the people and gave them 
special privileges. Military service was strictly voluntary, he argued, 
while those who did volunteer for local units were freed from work 
obligations. He addressed the economic problems in the OZAK, 
especially the difficulties which arose because of the high inflation 
spilling over from the Duce's neighboring republic. Instead of raising 
wages to increase buying power, as others might have done, Rainer 
sought to lower prices, especially on food and clothing, and he 
attempted to lower taxes. He contended that real wages did increase. In 
addition, he met with groups of workers and then with employers to 
explain his action and to listen to their needs. He ensured that laborers 
were hired close to where they lived and fought against the notion of 
moving industry from the OZAK. Not one factory, he argued, was taken 
to Germany or the Duce's Italy. In a summary statement, Rainer 
46 Rainer, "Osnivanje" 1604-1605. See also Report on conversation 
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asserted that no other occupied territory had such good officials and 
such a good administration. 47 
Finally, he claimed that his support and promotion of cultural, 
• 
intellectual, and civil activities was real. He helped the university in 
Trieste retain its autonomy. He paid special attention to museums, 
archives, historical buildings, and artifacts, forbidding the removal of 
relics from the OZAK and recovering those that had been taken by the 
Italians. He built bomb shelters for the populace in marked contrast to 
the Italians, who had not bothered, thinking that the Allies would not 
bomb their cities. He thus saved numerous lives in Reijeka, Pula, 
Trieste, Udine, and other cities and prevented high air raid casualties 
as in Germany. He gave large subsidies to theatres and musical 
companies and encouraged special performances. He established a 
symphony for Trieste and broadcast the new works of local composers. 
Even as the war was ending he continued to support the arts. A new 
performance of Carmen had been scheduled for 1 May 1945. Further, he 
encouraged sports, but not competition based on nationalities. Instead 
he endorsed events which focused on clubs. He created a special soccer 
prize, the Adria Cup. He supported radio broadcasts in Slovene, Italian, 
Croatian, as well as German. He declared that there were no strikes 
during his tenure. He asserted how he amnestied half the people 
sentenced to death in the courts. And he maintained that he alone saved 
the ports of the Adriatic from destruction by delaying the 
implementation of Hitler's orders.48 To the very end then, Rainer argued 
that he stubbornly followed a tolerant policy and insisted on national 
minority rights. The harsh germanization measures carried out in 
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Upper Camiola had been wrong and he tried to prevent any repeat in 
the OZAK. 
For the most part he did carry out the activities and programs as 
he claimed. He did lessen Italian fascist influence. He did introduce a 
different, if not better administration. He did support diverse ethnic 
groups. He did grant autonomy to many Slovenes. He did lessen Italian 
influence in the areas not clearly Italian. He did promote his version of 
peace and orderly affairs.49 But it is crucial to put his alledged 
accomplishments into the proper context. In fact he was the chief 
administrator of a police state in which extreme barbarity was practiced 
against partisans, dissidents, and not infrequently, innocent bystanders. 
His close friend, Police Chief and SS General Odilo Globocnik helped 
direct this repression, plus he managed the elimination of the small 
Jewish and dissident population in the OZAK.~ Police spies were 
everywhere and there were frequent capricious arrests. Rainer did 
nothing to stop any ofthis activity. He clearly accepted and worked in a 
system which asserted the right to illegitimate and arbitrary use of 
violence. In addition, his German advisors did not help the indigenous 
administrators so much as direct them, frequently with his specific 
orders. He forced tens of thousands of workers to build a massive 
defence barrier from the Adriatic to the Alps. He used other conscripted 
labour from all over Europe to build a major tunnel through the 
mountains. For young men his definition of volunteering meant joining 
either the military or the labor battalions. Finally, he ruled over an 
area, not at peace, but one at war, which meant military needs took 
precedence over civilian administration. There was an overwhelming 
presence of the army whose task was to protect Germans and defend 
Greater Germany. In the end then, Rainer did not really abandon 
German predominance and his German nationalism. He just introduced 
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Yet his approach of "basic minority rights" in the Adriatic 
Coastland stood in marked contrast to the strict German nationalism he 
had practiced earlier in Upper Carniola. Why did he change? The 
answer is not complicated. He was an adroit, pragmatic politician. He 
recognized that the Nazis in Upper Carniola had reached "the limits of 
Germandom. "52 Ifthey could not germanize there, they certainly could 
not in the Adriatic region. The tiny German population was dwarfed by 
the other three ethnic groups. Rainer also recognized that two of the 
three groups in the OZAK were Germany's allies, the Italians under the 
Duce and the Croatians. Allies should have, at least, basic national 
rights. In addition, he read the reports that showed a situation 
unfavorable to the Germans. In September 1943, when he arrived in the 
OZAK, the western part of Istria was occupied by the partisans, the 
communists were very strong in Trieste and neighboring Monfalcone, 
and parts in the north were controlled by Italian guerrillas. 53 Rainer was 
astute enough to see that a temporary multi-ethnic approach suited the 
Nazis in the region. For very practical reasons then he turned from an 
advocate of intense germanization to supporter of ethnic diversity. 
Although many of the particulars in Rainer's account need 
more investigation, and frequently refutation, his postwar document is 
an important discovery. Here is the Nazi apologist, the chief of the 
OZAK, offering valuable information on the region's National Socialist 
government. Even if Rainer was opportunistic, placing himself in the 
best possible light he was after all writing for Slovene jailers he has 
provided the insider's perspective. He confirms the contrast between 
policy in Upper Carniola and methods advocated further south in the 
Adriatic Coastland. In addition, he shows that his efforts were the 
mirror image of republican Austria before the second war. Like Austria 
which did not know how to define itself, so with Rainer. Did he look to 
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Germany or the Habsburg heritage for direction and identity? Rainer 
spent most of his life advocating the German way but when faced with 
geographic realities and cultural strengths he practiced the Habsburg 
legacy. However, it was not that he believed strongly in the other 
nationalities and the notion of ethnic diversity. He was still a German 
supremicist. He advocated the other concepts so he could divide his 
opposition and ensure the dominance of his side. That he failed was 
obvious. But that he promoted ethnic diversity, even if for the wrong 
reasons, is an auspicious factor, especially in this region. 
Okanagan University College 
POVZETEK 
NACISTI, NEMSKI NACIONALIZEM IN ETNICNA 
RAZNOLIKOST: JADRANSKA OBALA POD FRIEDRICHOM 
RAINERJEM 
Ob pregledu nove, pred kratkim odkrite dokumentacije, katere avtor je 
Friedrich Rainer, nacisticni pove/jnik Koroske, Kranjske in Istre, naletimo 
na izrazit kontrast. Gre za primerjavo Rainerjeve politike do okupiranega 
ozemlja Gorenjske s politiko do operacijske cone Jadranska obala. 
Dokumentacija kaze, kako je Rainer spremenil svojo dejavnost od strogega 
nemSkega nacionalista v Sloveniji do zagovornika etnicne raznolikosti ob 
Jadranu. Medtem ko je Rainer prezivel veeino svojega ziv/jenja zavzemajoc se 
za nemski nacionalizem, pa se je ob soocenju z geografsko realnostjo in 
kulturno raznolikostjo ob jadranski obali obnasal bo/j po habsbursko-
podpiral je etnicno raznolikost. 
